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An Interview with Terry A. Winograd 
 
I. Introductory Note 
 
Terry A. Winograd (born 1946) began his academic career within the field of artificial 
intelligence. His early research on natural language understanding by computers was a 
milestone in artificial intelligence. Later he moved to the field of human computer 
interaction, and within this field he has done extensive research and writing on design 
of human-computer interaction. Foremost, focusing on the theoretical background and 
conceptual models for human-computer interaction design. 
 
Terry Winograd received his B.A. in Mathematics from The Colorado College in 1966. 
He studied Linguistics at University College, London in 1966-1967, and earned his 
Ph.D. in Applied Mathematics at Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) in 1970. 
From 1970 he was an instructor and assistant professor of Electrical Engineering at 
MIT, before coming to Stanford University in 1973, where he is now a professor of 
Computer Science. At Stanford, he directs the Project on People, Computers, and 
Design, and the teaching and research program on Human-Computer Interaction 
Design. He is one of the principal investigators in the Stanford Digital Libraries project, 
and the Interactive Workspaces Project. He is also a consultant to Interval Research 
Corporation, and serves on a number of journal editorial boards, including the Journal 
of Human Computer Interaction, Computer Supported Cooperative Work, and Personal 
Technologies. 
 
Prof. Winograd is a longtime advocate for socially responsible computing and is a 
founding member and past national president (1987-1990) of the Computer 
Professionals for Social Responsibility, and is on the National Advisory Board of the 
Association for Software Design. His publications include ‘Understanding Natural 
Language’ (1972), ‘Understanding Computers and Cognition: A New Foundation for 
Design’ (with Fernando Flores, 1986)2, and ‘Bringing Design to Software’ (with John 
Bennett, Laura De Young, and Bradley Hartfield, 1996, which brings together the 
perspectives of a number of leading proponents of software design. 
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 II. Terry Winograd and Artificial Intelligence 
 
Prof. Winograd’s initial breakthrough in the field of artificial intelligence was with the 
SHRDLU program, which he wrote at the M.I.T. Artificial Intelligence Laboratory in 
1968-1970. SHRDLU is described in his dissertation, issued as MIT AI technical report 
235, February 1971 with the title: Procedures as a Representation for data in a 
Computer Program for Understanding Natural Language. It was published as a full 
issue of the Journal of Cognitive Psychology, vol. 3, no. 1 (1972), Understanding 
Natural Language (Academic Press 1972). 
 
SHRDLU understands natural language. It carries on a simple dialog (via teletype) with 
a user, about a small world of objects (the Blocks World) shown on a display screen. 
SHRDLU has complete knowledge of the internally represented block world consisting 
of colored cubes, pyramids and boxes on a flat surface. The program simulates a robot, 
it accepts commands in English with regard to the block world, carries out the 
command, and explains how it did it and why certain actions were performed. In 
addition, it has the ability to learn about new tasks. 
 
SHRDLU uses important ideas about human syntactic semantic and problem solving 
activities and about their interactions in understanding natural language discourse. 
Understanding of English requires an integrated study of syntax semantics and 
inference. Winograd felt that the best way to experiment with complex models of 
language was to write a program, which can actually understand language within some 
domain. In this case with a robot which has a hand and eye and the ability to manipulate 
toy blocks. The program attempts; 
 
1) to be a usable language understanding system. 
2) to gain a better understanding of what language is and how to put it together. 
3) to understand what intelligence is and how it can be put into computers. 
 
                                                                                                                                               
2 In this book they take a critical look at work in artificial intelligence and suggest new directions for the 
design of computer systems and their integration into human activity. 
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SHRDLU is head and shoulders above contemporary systems when it comes to 
intelligent conversation. Although its domain of discourse is restricted to a tabletop 
world of colored objects SHRDLU really understands this world in terms of the relation 
between semantics and the physical properties of the blocks and the tabletop. It consists 
of subsystems that parse interpret and construct sentences, carry out dictionary searches 
and semantic analyses and makes logical deductions. 
 
SHRDLU uses Halliday's systemic grammar, which emphasizes the limited and highly 
structured choices made in producing syntactic structure abstracting the features that are 
important for conveying meaning. The parser is special and interprets the recognition 
grammars. Meaning is covered by the development of a formalism for concepts within a 
language user's model of the world representing objects events and relationships. 
Semantics is represented by a system, which is developed to work in conjunction with 
the parser, a dictionary and the problem solving programs. It considers not only 
meaning, but also context. 
 
III. Purpose of Interview 
 
The present interview is one of a number of interviews with people who are or have 
been involved in AI research. The purpose of these interviews is to learn about their 
views of the AI-field and the work of other AI scientists. 
As it appears from above Prof. Winograd was heavily involved in AI research earlier in 
his scientific career, but he decided to leave the field of AI. Elsewhere he describes his 
conversations with Hubert L. Dreyfus as influential to his own “complete shift of 
research direction, away from artificial intelligence towards a phenomenologically 
informed perspective on human-computer interaction” (Winograd, 2000). Using this as 
the point of departure it was assumed that he would provide interesting answers to 
questions such: 
 
- What attracted him to AI in the first place? 
- Being a "second generation" or may be even "third generation" AI-scientist, how 
does he think that his view on AI differs from the view held by "first generation" 
AI-scientists? 
- What is he view on the work by other AI scientists? 
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- Why did he choose to leave the field of AI? 
 
And thereby, contribute to our understanding of the history of AI. 
 
V. References 
 
Winograd, T. (2000) Foreword. In: M. Wrathall and J. Malpas (eds.) Heidegger, Coping 
and Cognitive Science – Essays in the honor of Hubert L. Dreyfus – volume 2. 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
(Available at: http://www.idiom.com/~gdreyfus/70Celebration/Foreword2.html) 
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VI. The Interview3 
 
The following conversation took place between Professor Terry A. Winograd (TW) and 
Morten Thanning Vendelø (MV) on February 29. 2000, in the Department of Computer 
Science, Stanford University, California. 
 
MV: Could you tell a little about your educational background. I know that you got a 
BA in Mathematics from The Colorado College, then went to University College 
in London and studied linguistics there, and then went to MIT for your Ph.D. but 
is there a storyline in choosing that path for your education? 
 
TW:  The storyline is that I went to a liberal arts college that had no engineering and 
very little mathematics. So my mathematics major didn’t mean that I did a lot of 
mathematics. I was interested in language, and they didn’t have a linguistics 
course, but I convinced the anthropology teacher to give me a readings course in 
linguistics. Also, I became acquainted with computers, not through coursework 
but outside class during my last couple of years in college. In addition, I saw 
some writings by Marvin Minsky describing artificial intelligence and thought it 
was pretty fascinating. So I applied to MIT because of these computer interests, 
and I also applied for a Fulbright Grant to study linguistics abroad. That was 
basically opportunistic. People said: “It is wonderful experience to go to Europe 
for a year on a Fulbright, you should do it.” So the driving force was going to 
Europe, not the specific content. At that time my belief (which I now realize 
ironically was false) was that there was no interesting computing work going on 
outside the United States. If I had known what was going on in computing in 
England I might have done something different. The only language I had studied 
in college was Russian, and at that time going to Russia on a Fulbright Grant 
was not an opportunity. So I was limited to English speaking countries and since 
I was interested in language I decided to do a year of study in linguistics. So I 
simply went through the catalogues of the British universities looking for what 
seemed to be the most interesting linguistics program from the point of view of 
what I wanted to do. I found the program at University College, London, with a 
                                                 
3 This transcription of the interview has been with Terry Winograd for review. 
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professor Halliday and I applied to it although I did not have a very coherent 
intellectual plan. I came from Colorado, a small state, and since Fulbright had a 
quota by state I had an advantage in getting the grant. So that’s how I got the 
Fulbright and studied linguistics for a year in London. If I had not got the grant, 
I would have gone directly to MIT and not done the linguistics work. Because 
once you were at MIT, you couldn’t do computer science and linguistics at the 
same time. 
When I would meet Chomsky’s students at a party and say: “I work in the AI 
Lab.” they would turn around and walk away. That was it. There was no 
communication, but active hostility between Minsky and Chomsky. So when I 
came back from the year in London to start at MIT I already had a lot of interest 
in language and a year of background in linguistics. That is how I ended up 
doing a language project. 
 
MV: You said that you became interested in computers. What was it about computers 
that made you interested in them and in AI? 
 
TW: When I was a junior in college a professor in medicine who had been at a larger 
medical center ended up moving to this small hospital in Colorado Springs. He 
had previously hired programmers to work on his research. He had a very early 
computer, which he used for doing calculations on radiation therapy. So he sent 
a note over to the math department saying: “Do you have any math students that 
can help me with my computer?” So my first exposure to computers was a 
personal computer. There was a room and there was this desk-sized thing (a 
CDC 160) and I was the only person using the computer. I had a great time so 
that was how I got into computing. 
 
MV: But how did you become interested in AI? 
 
TW: The question was, which field was combining computers and language, because 
they were the two things I was interested in. 
 
MV: You said that at MIT there were no connections between computer science and 
linguistics? 
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 TW: Minsky and Chomsky were both very strong personalities. You could go to one 
or the other but you couldn’t be in the middle. That is how MIT is, it has strong 
boundaries between its departments. 
 
MV: But you were allowed to do computers and linguistics? 
 
TW: Minsky wanted me to do linguistics and prove that his students could do better 
linguistics than Chomsky’s. I was not the first. Dave Waltz, who eventually 
went on to do work in vision, was doing a research project on linguistics when I 
got there, as was Gene Charniak. And in the prior generation Daniel Bobrow and 
Bertram Raphael had both done language projects. So it was a major stream of 
work in the AI Lab. 
 
MV: What was it that made you make this connection between AI and language, why 
did you choose this connection between computers and language? 
 
TW: I had the question: “How could you make computers use language?” And by 
definition the answer is AI, because computers don’t do language by themselves. 
Fortran programs didn’t do language, except for Joe Weizenbaum’s program, 
but that was not a standard Fortran program. My direction wasn’t because of any 
philosophical commitment to artificial intelligence. It was because of an interest 
in understanding how language worked, using computers as the tool. 
 
MV: How would you describe the artificial intelligence environment at MIT at that 
point in time? If you talk to some people who went to Carnegie Tech in the late 
1950s and 1960s they describe it as an intellectual supernova? 
 
TW: It was a very exciting time because people were getting their hands on machines 
that previously either were available only for serious and highly specialized 
scientific work. We could try things out that nobody had ever tried before. So 
people came up with all sorts of interesting things, some of which turned out to 
be very important and some of which didn’t. The excitement is like being in a 
gold rush or exploring new territory. There are all these nuggets lying on the 
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ground and you can pick them up to see what you can do with them. Also, there 
was a very strong sense of that we were building the future.  
I would not call it an intellectual supernova in that there was no emphasis on 
deep intellectual thought. The quest was to build stuff and see what it did, and 
then build more stuff and make new things happen. But it wasn’t intellectually 
grounded. Carnegie was much more grounded in Simon’s and Newell’s 
theoretical interests and AI was driven by their theory. Whereas at MIT it was 
more a hacking approach if you can call it that. Those people highly respected in 
the lab were not cognitive researchers, but virtuoso programmers -- hackers. 
 
MV: So this linking at Carnegie between economics, AI and cognitive science did not 
exist at all at MIT? 
 
TW: No, it was looked down upon as a kind of waste of effort. “We are building 
wonderful new stuff, why worry about how people think about economics?” 
 
MV: You completed your Ph.D. at MIT and then you went to Stanford. How would 
you describe the environment at Stanford compared to MIT? 
 
TW: They were pretty similar. John McCarthy had developed AI Lab here. It was a 
bit more independent because it had its own building up in the hills -- it wasn’t 
even sharing a building with the rest of computer science. It was funded in the 
same way as the MIT Lab, which is by large umbrella programs. This meant that 
individual projects had a lot of latitude to do whatever they felt like and research 
didn’t have to be justified on a project-by-project basis. There were a lot of 
machines and a lot of work on robotics. As for its emphasis, it was pretty much a 
sister environment to MIT, and thereby distinct from Carnegie, with its more 
cognitively grounded environment. Stanford put more emphasis on using formal 
logic because John McCarthy likes formal logic and Marvin Minsky didn’t. 
 
MV: Did you have any contact with Ed Feigenbaum about AI when you arrived here? 
 
TW: It depends on what you mean by contact. He was not in the AI lab. I was up on 
the hill with McCarthy’s lab and Feigenbaum was somewhere on campus with 
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his expert system projects. He was there when they hired me, and he was on the 
faulty committee and so on, but in terms of day-to-day contact we had very little. 
 
MV: Was it because you had these two different views on AI? 
 
TW: Again it was two different camps. There was Feigenbaum students and 
McCarthy students, and Feigenbaum faculty and McCarthy faculty. And you 
really didn’t cross those boundaries. It wasn’t as hostile as between Minsky and 
Chomsky, but it was still a very clear divide. 
 
MV: If we look at these two different ways of doing AI, and were to do an evaluation 
of them today, How would you evaluate them in terms of their progress / 
contribution to AI? 
 
TW: It is good question. I think that Feigenbaum was much more eager and willing to 
say: “I want practical and commercial applications and I don’t care how deep or 
interesting the theory is.” If you look at his so-called theoretical principles, they 
are very shallow. The focus was on practical use. If you look at the fifth 
generation work, it is fairly mundane from an intellectual point of view, but they 
actually tried to make it commercially relevant. On the other hand, McCarthy is 
really a pure mathematician. His interests have nothing to do with making 
money or applying AI. They have to do with coming up with deeper theories. I 
happen not to agree with McCarthy’s theoretical leanings, but I think that it is 
good that he had them and was trying to drive the program from a conceptual 
point of view, instead of a kind of opportunistic way. 
 
MV: You said that you didn’t interact with the linguists at MIT. But did the work by, 
for instance, Noam Chomsky inspire you? 
 
TW: It did indirectly, but my direct source of inspiration came from the year in 
London where I studied with Halliday. If you look at what Halliday was doing in 
the context of the larger picture of generative grammar, he was trying to adapt 
his theories, which came more from a social perspective, to a generative form. In 
my opinion, the merger never worked. If you look at the subsequent work of 
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Halliday in linguistics, the attempts to do generative grammar have been much 
less successful than the return to systemic grammar’s roots as a socio-linguistic 
analysis. But certainly nevertheless the training was important, I took a course in 
transformational grammar during that year, so I had learned it. Chomsky’s basic 
insight was that synchronistic language can be described fairly well with a 
generative rule-based system. That was at the heart not only of his work but also 
of the work by anybody who was trying to use computers, because if you cannot 
put language into a rule-based system, then you cannot program it. So in that 
sense I think it was very much along the lines of Chomsky. The differences are 
at the next level where Chomsky posited a structure of transformations, which 
was not computationally implemented while those in AI were focused on finding 
appropriate algorithms. So I was on the algorithm side and not the formal 
grammar side. 
 
MV: Returning to your time at MIT. Would you say that your view of AI is similar to 
that of Marvin Minsky’s? How would you position yourself in relation to him? 
 
TW: We differ in a couple of major ways. One is his basic faith that the intelligence 
embodied in organisms, for instance people, is very similar in nature to the 
programs we write in AI. Not necessarily in detail but in basic nature. I disagree 
with that fundamental assumption about symbolic processing, which I critiqued 
in the book I wrote with Fernando Flores. The other key differences are 
Minsky’s view on the role of human values and the role of machines. If you ask: 
“What is Minsky’s religion?” Then it is some abstract notion of the progress of 
intelligence. The values he was pursuing had to do with a drive towards higher 
intelligence as a value in itself. I have always been a much more political, social 
oriented kind of person for whom other human values take priority. 
 
MV: In my first e-mail I mentioned that you might be what we can call a second or 
may be even a third generation AI scientist. How would describe yourself in 
contrast to the first or may be the second generation? 
 
TW: People like Minsky and Newell and so on were the immigrants. None of them 
started their intellectual life in artificial intelligence, as it didn’t exist. So they 
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went in and made it happen. Then the second generation, which I would include 
myself in, followed in their labs. At MIT there were Tom Evans, Daniel 
Bobrow, Bertram Raphael and Adolfo Guzman and so on, and then in a later 
round there were Gerald Sussman, Carl Hewitt, Dave Waltz, me, Eugene 
Charniak, Pat Winston, and others. But there wasn’t any major transition 
between those two. I think it was more gradually increasing machinery and more 
sophistication, but it was pretty much the same spirit. We did not have to 
develop the context. The context was there, the machines were there, LISP was 
there and so on. So we could just take a problem and apply those things. 
 
MV: And then your own idea for your block-moving program SHRDLU, how did it 
come about? 
 
TW: Basically the block-moving problem was chosen because I wanted to do 
something more concrete. Bill Woods at Harvard was using airline reservation 
systems as a language domain, but I didn't find them very interesting. Minsky 
had the idea that I should do something about stories for children, because he 
thought they were much more simple than stories for adults. I was not so sure 
about that and wanted to do something else. There were others at the lab 
building robot hand-eye systems that actually moved blocks around on a 
tabletop. So I don't know if it was me or Minsky, but we arrived with the idea of 
doing a system that conversed about block moving. But there was never any real 
robot arm connected to my work. 
 
MV: It was common for AI scientists from Carnegie Tech to go to RAND and many 
people perceive RAND as very important to the development of AI. Did you 
ever go to RAND? 
 
TW: No and I cannot remember anyone from RAND coming to MIT, and I cannot 
remember that anyone from MIT went to RAND. I remember it as a pure 
Carnegie connection. 
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MV: In the middle of the 1980s you wrote and published a book with Fernando 
Flores, where you articulate a more critical view of AI. How did you meet 
Fernando Flores? 
 
TW: I went to a meeting where I met a Chilean scientist, Francisco Varela, who said: 
“How is Fernando Flores?” I said: “Fernando who?” And he said: “Fernando 
Flores. He is at Stanford.” And I said: “Oh well Stanford is a big place and I 
don’t know where he is.” And he said: “No, he is in the Computer Science 
Department at Stanford,” and I said: “No, this cannot be, I am in the Computer 
Science Department I go to all the faculty meetings and I have never heard of 
Fernando Flores.” He said: “I know Fernando Flores is in the Computer Science 
Department.” So when I got back I looked him up, and it turned out that he was 
indeed there. After being in the government of Salvador Allende that was 
overthrown by a coup, Fernando had been imprisoned for three years. The San 
Francisco Chapter of Amnesty International took up him as a “prisoner of 
conscience,” and one of the conditions for his release that the Chilean 
government put up was that he had to have a job waiting for him outside of the 
country. Two professors from our department, Bob Floyd and George Dantzig, 
had a position they could support from various grants that were close enough to 
what he had done before going into government that they could justify hiring 
him. So without having a specific demand on his work they created a research 
associate position for him at Stanford so that he could have a job, so that they 
could get him out of prison. But he had just been in prison in Chile for three 
years and had been flown to California, where he was getting oriented and 
reconnecting with his family, so he was not spending his time in the Computer 
Science Department.  
 
I looked him up, and he is a tremendously intellectual guy, probably the most 
intellectual, in some deep sense, that I have ever known. He is also practical, but 
he is the kind of thinker who can read six philosophy books before breakfast. He 
has this incredible mind always thinking and always looking for more, so he 
wanted to find out who at the department were interested in talking to him. We 
started talking in a casual way, then he handed me a book on philosophy of 
science and said “You should read this.” I read it, and we started talking about it, 
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and we decided to write a paper about it that turned into a monograph that turned 
into a book. It was a gradual process of finding him interesting, and finding the 
stuff we were talking about intellectually stimulating. He only kept his job at 
Stanford for a short time, and then went to Berkeley as a Ph.D.-student, because 
he wanted to have a Ph.D. In Chile he had gone into politics before he had 
finished his Ph.D. I was officially on his committee there, but it was never a 
question who was leading and who was following. 
 
MV: You are also one of the founders of the organization called: Computer 
Professionals for Social Responsibility. Did it have any connection with your 
decision to leave the field of AI? 
 
TW: No, the two issues are really separate. My interest in CPSR grew out of nuclear 
war issues. In those years any organization that had social responsibility in its 
name was basically trying to prevent nuclear holocaust. The American 
government seemed to be headed down this track, and every group said: How 
can we help? First there was Physicians for Social Responsibility, then 
Educators for Social Responsibility, Architects for Social Responsibility, 
Psychologists for Social Responsibility, and so on. It was clear that there were a 
lot of computing issues involved in warfare and when the Star Wars program 
(SDI) came along it was very clear that it was based on assumptions about 
computing that were not valid. We picked up on this as the key issue. The only 
place where it touched on the areas of AI was to the degree that military funding 
and military applications were based on practical applications of AI. But as to 
whether the theory of AI in general was right or wrong, a good idea or a bad 
idea, was just never in the purview of that kind of politically oriented activity. 
CPSR was not philosophically oriented but politically oriented. 
 
MV: And then after AI you moved on to HCI, what let you in that direction? 
 
TW: I think that I was always doing it. I just didn’t realize it. When I was writing 
systems to use language there were two somewhat independent motivations. One 
is to model and understand human language, and the other is to make computers 
easier to use. What I realized was that making computers easier to use, was not 
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the same as making them use ordinary language. There are many other issues 
involved in how to get people and computers to interact well. For a lot of the 
cognitive studies, you can turn them around. Instead of thinking of how to model 
people with the computer you use cognitive analyses of people, to better fit the 
computer to them. – how to interface with them, rather than how to duplicate 
them. Much of what we have learned in AI is very relevant to HCI.  
There was a period of about five years where I had no label for my work. 
Because I was out of AI and I was doing a sort of philosophical writing, but I 
wasn’t a philosopher. I realized that really HCI was more compatible if I wanted 
to be in the university environment. The kind of cognitive-philosophical 
reflection that I was doing with Flores was not a viable program for graduate 
students in a Computer Science Department. There needed to be something 
much more concrete that the concepts could be applied to. If you read the book 
with Flores you see a kind of open promissory note at the end, which says all of 
this theory should guide you in the design of systems. So that is really how I got 
off into Human Computer Interaction -- asking how to make some of these more 
philosophical considerations guide us in the design of systems that work with 
people. 
 
MV: Another issue related to this is that a lot of people tend to view AI as the 
ultimate science in the sense that the big question we have here is: What is the 
nature of human intelligence? And therefore, it is one of the biggest questions 
that you can work on as a scientist, and most else come second. Is this an 
opinion that you share? 
 
TW: I think that my sense of it, and this is in a broad sense my opinion for scientific 
research, is that for a scientific topic to be good to work on there have to be at 
least three things that come together. One is resources -- funding. One is that it is 
an interesting problem, and the third is that you are at the right point in 
intellectual and technical history to have some leverage on the problem. 
Scientists a hundred or two hundred years ago could have thought that it was a 
fascinating problem to understand how the brain works, and they might have 
built models of it. But they wouldn’t have gotten very far because they didn’t 
have the background knowledge. My sense of AI is that we are not there yet. If I 
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were a young person going into science today, I might very well go into biology 
or neuroscience, because I think there are all sorts of things that we yet don’t 
know about real brains and nervous systems. We need to develop better 
fundamental principles of how information systems and biologic information 
systems work, without trying to pretend that they are what we have in silicon, 
just sloppier. After another 10, 20 or 50 years of great research in that area it will 
be the moment when somebody can say: “Ah, we can put this together.” My 
own hunch about where we are is that we are still missing the basic knowledge 
that will make AI a productive science. 
 
MV: So you don’t share these more optimistic views on AI? 
 
TW: Well, what I just said is that it will happen. I just think that we are much further 
away than many AI proponents think we are. I certainly don’t believe that the 
basic science that we need is there, and that it is just a matter of putting together 
the mechanisms. It is going to take quite some time before we get there, and it is 
going to come out of the biologic science and not out of more computer 
development at this point. 
 
MV: So more work is needed, but in different areas than many AI-scientists believe. 
Do you share the reductionistic view of AI that some AI-scientists pursue? 
 
TW: There are two different levels. I share the physicalist view. If you say: “Is there 
anything going on in my mind which cannot be explained by the motion of 
molecules in my brain?” I don’t believe it. I believe that thinking is purely a 
mechanical process. If by reductionistic you mean, when I am thinking about a 
dog, will that be correspond to activating some kind of computer-like symbol for 
the concept of dog, then I don’t believe it. So it is a physical reductionism but 
not a symbolic reductionism, if you want to distinguish among those two. 
 
MV: Given that the needed biological knowledge is in place, how far do you think we 
can go with artificial intelligence? 
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TW: Starting from scratch and building up a mind will not be the way it goes. It will 
be more likely to incorporate hybrids that combine real biological systems with 
some amount of artificial stuff. We will be able to engineer changes to real 
biological systems genetically or chemically. So the question: “Could you build 
intelligence?” will not be the interesting question. It will be more a question of 
extending and adapting intelligence. I don’t think that there are ultimate limits in 
the sense that we can never achieve a certain kind of intelligence. I don’t know 
where they are, and I have no particular reason to believe that they are not 
hundred or thousand years away. But in principle the brain is a mechanical 
system, just a very complex one. 
 
MV: If you look 20 years or so ahead, do you then have any hopes for artificial 
intelligence. In terms of what would be a good outcome of the work being done 
in the field? 
 
TW: I think that what will happen in twenty years is a continuation of what we see 
now. Consider speech understanding. When I was a graduate student there were 
heated arguments as to whether a computer needed full logical understanding to 
understand speech. It is easy to come up with words that sound alike and whole 
phrases that sound alike but mean different things, and you have to understand 
this. What has happened is, that as computers were able to process more and 
more data and compute higher level statistics and more analysis, we have got 
programs for speech dictation that achieve accuracies up to 90% without any 
logical understanding. You have programs listening to you, which don’t have 
any logical understanding of what you are saying and they do it pretty well. I 
think that we are going to see those boundaries pushed more in various 
applications such as visual recognition. It is not necessarily going to be because 
of new insights into how people do these tasks, which would be scientifically 
interesting. Instead it is going to be because you can just throw enough 
processing power at it to do an acceptable job. So I think that a lot of things 
which people in the early days though of as proofs of deep AI, including chess 
as an the obvious example, will just be handled by not deep AI but by a lot of 
processing power. We have almost seen success at chess that way. Computers 
haven’t quite been beating Kasparov consistently yet, but they are doing well. AI 
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success will be in a number of applications, none of which will have the flavor 
that the original AI people though about, which is: “This machine is thinking 
like a person.” Instead, it will use extensive computation and incorporate 
statistical methods. When I was a student in the AI Lab nobody there even 
studied statistics, nobody even mentioned statistics. Today non-symbolic 
techniques are critical in most branches of AI. As for any major imminent 
breakthroughs in AI, I don’t see them, but usually you don’t see a breakthrough 
before it happens. 
 
MV: OK, this was my last question, so thank you for your time. 
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